What this report finds: The U.S. is poorly prepared for the next recession—but not for the reasons most people think (allegedly too-high public debt and too-low interest rates). Instead, we’re poorly prepared because we never made a dent in reducing inequality during the current economic expansion, and because too many of our policymakers have not fully grasped the economic fact that fiscal policy, particularly increases to public spending, is the most effective tool for ending a recession and aiding recovery. Monetary policy (Federal Reserve action) plays an important supporting role, but it cannot fight a recession by itself.
Why it matters: There is a real possibility that the U.S. economy could slip into a recession sometime in the next 18 months. Unfortunately, for political reasons, policymakers are often resistant to increasing public spending during a recession—especially when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high—even though overwhelming evidence shows that that is the most effective way to put a quick end to a recession.
What can be done about it: Heading into the next recession, policymakers should be ready with proposals that provide an effective fiscal boost to aggregate demand growth. Policies should be constructed not only to be effective economically, but also to be effective politically, in order to ensure broad and engaged popular support.
This June will mark 10 years of consistent economic expansion since the end of the Great Recession. That’s along the outer edges of how long economic expansions have lasted in the past century, leading many observers to wonder how soon the next recession will strike—and what will precipitate it.
This report briefly discusses these questions and then explores at greater length a much more important question: What can policymakers do about the next recession when it does hit?
When and why will the next recession come? There is a real possibility that the U.S. economy could slip into recession sometime in the next 18 months; this risk is due largely to excessive interest rate increases in recent years and a likely fading of fiscal stimulus.
The Trump administration has proven neither nimble nor smart when it comes to macroeconomic management. In particular, its attempt to dismantle many of the constraints put on financial sector speculation following the Great Recession is clearly a threat to future macroeconomic stability.
What have we learned from the last recession? A key lesson from the Great Recession is that fiscal policy is the most effective tool for aiding recovery. Monetary policy can lay the groundwork for fiscal policy, but really cannot be relied on to play more than a supporting role for fighting recessions.
How well prepared are we for the next recession? We are not well prepared, but not for the reasons some people think.
Truly harmful shortcomings in readying the economy for the next recession include failures to:
What can policymakers do to start preparing? Heading into the next recession, policymakers should be ready with proposals that provide an effective fiscal boost to aggregate demand growth. One key lesson from the Great Recession is that these policies should be constructed not only to be effective economically, but also to be effective politically, in order to ensure broad and engaged popular support.
The current economic expansion is nearly a decade old, making it among the longest on record. Figure A shows the length of business cycles (measured from business cycle peak to peak) since World War II. As of June 2019, the current recovery will match the 1990s expansion, the longest on record in the post–World War II era.
| Trough (end of previous recession) | Expansion’s duration (months) | Projected future duration |
|---|---|---|
| Oct 1945 | 37 | – |
| Oct 1949 | 45 | – |
| May 1954 | 39 | – |
| Apr 1958 | 24 | – |
| Feb 1961 | 106 | – |
| Nov 1970 | 36 | – |
| Mar 1975 | 58 | – |
| Jul 1980 | 12 | – |
| Nov 1982 | 92 | – |
| Mar 1991 | 120 | – |
| Nov 2001 | 73 | – |
| Jun 2009 | 117 | 3 |
The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.
The data underlying the figure.
Note: The light blue part of the last bar indicates projected future duration of the current expansion through June 2019.
Source: Data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER 2019)
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However, there is little evidence that the risk of recession rises simply as a function of the length of the previous expansion. Given this, nobody really knows when the next recession might come. What we can know is what factors have triggered past recessions—and how likely these are to recur in the near future.
The common root cause of each recession is a contraction of economywide spending (or aggregate demand) relative to the economy’s potential productive capacity. As consumers (households, businesses, or governments) cut back their spending, it doesn’t make sense for producers to keep generating as much economic output. As a result, these producers make cuts to their workforce and let their capital stocks fall idle. Think of a hotel in a major city. As economywide spending slows, they receive fewer business and tourist bookings. This leads hotel rooms (their key capital stock) to sit empty, which in turn leads them to lay off cleaning staff.
Recessions are caused across the board by a shortfall of aggregate demand relative to the economy’s potential. Ending a recession, therefore, requires replenishing aggregate demand.
The most specific causes of aggregate demand contractions, and resulting recessions, in the post–World War II period have been fiscal contractions (often caused by military spending drawdowns), monetary policy tightening (the Federal Reserve overshooting in attempts to fight inflation by raising interest rates too high), and popping asset market bubbles. Below, we examine each of these past causes in turn, to consider whether any of these threaten to derail the expansion in coming years.
Luckily, there seems to be little danger that fiscal contraction will cause a recession in the near future.1 Ironically, fiscal policy was far too contractionary during most of the recovery since the Great Recession, yet it became expansionary in 2018 with the tax cuts and the large increases in discretionary spending (both defense and nondefense) passed at the end of 2017.
It is important to note that, contrary to claims made in fiscal policy discussions in 2018, the boost provided by the increases to spending was clearly larger than the boost provided by the tax cuts. The tax cuts, while expensive in budgetary terms, were terribly designed for providing fiscal support because they provided so much of their benefit to higher-income households whose current spending is not constrained by income.2 In fact, it is fair to say that one could have provided the same degree of fiscal support as the tax cuts while spending about 70 percent less in fiscal resources if these resources had been dedicated to public investments or safety net spending.3
Nevertheless, the tax cuts and increased spending did provide a fiscal boost to the economy. But even with this clear recent evidence of the benefits of expansionary fiscal policy (even poorly designed fiscal policy), the Trump administration continues to parrot evidence-free warnings about the danger of excess federal debt. This debt fearmongering is seen in their annual budget proposals, which call for draconian levels of austerity.4 It is worth noting that if these budget proposals had ever actually been enacted, they would clearly have caused a recession. But, for the next year, there seems little prospect that the Trump administration’s professed desire for more austerity will be fulfilled by a split Congress.
Finally, much of the catastrophic fiscal drag that delayed full recovery from the Great Recession was actually imposed by state and local governments.5 State and local austerity was worse where Republicans controlled the major levers of state government (think Sam Brownback’s Kansas and Scott Walker’s Wisconsin). Hopefully, the swing in state government control away from Republicans in the last election will make another wave of state-led austerity less likely in the next few years.
Excessively contractionary monetary policy is likely the single most common cause of recessions in the post–World War II period. When the Federal Reserve thinks that growth in aggregate demand threatens to run ahead of growth in the economy’s productive capacity and spark accelerating inflation, it raises interest rates to keep the economy from “overheating.”6 These interest rate hikes slow debt-financed spending—which includes much business investment, most home purchases, and many purchases of durable goods (like automobiles). Too often, however, the Fed has raised rates too far and too fast, and the result has been a recession.
Too-rapid interest rate increases clearly played a role in the recessions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Worrying about excessively contractionary monetary policy today might strike some as odd given the Fed’s key role in fostering recovery from the Great Recession of 2008–2009. The Fed made the earliest decisive policy decisions to support aggregate demand and was willing to undertake historically unprecedented actions to keep the recovery moving forward in the face of fiscal austerity. They also kept monetary policy expansionary for years after the recession’s end, even in the face of warnings (baseless, as time has shown) that they were risking an outbreak of uncontrolled inflation.
Despite this admirable record during the recession and the first few years of recovery, the Fed’s eventual rate increases (beginning at the end of 2015) still came too soon, and they have followed on too fast since. In 2018, the signature of excessively rapid interest rate increases slowing economic growth was clear. Residential investment contracted in each quarter in 2018, the first time this has happened since 2009. The trade deficit also expanded and weighed on growth, with American exports and import-competing domestic producers hampered by a U.S. dollar whose value was rising as American interest rates attracted capital inflows from around the world. These two drags on growth—contraction of residential investment and a rising trade deficit—are exactly those predicted by those who worry that excessively fast interest rate increases will slow spending. If the drag from more-contractionary monetary policy continues in 2019 with no offsetting new fiscal stimulus, the economy could certainly see a sharp slowdown in growth in the coming year.
Given that Donald Trump has occasionally criticized recent interest rate hikes, should his administration be exempt from blame in terms of the harms of contractionary monetary policy? Not particularly. While he sometimes tweets like a monetary policy dove, Trump’s nominations to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (BOG) have clearly shifted the Fed to a less-expansionary stance. The administration’s first two nominations to the BOG—Randal Quarles and Marvin Goodfriend—were both consistently wrong about the need to raise interest rates to avoid inflation in recent years. If the Fed had followed their advice, unemployment would be considerably higher today.7 While the Goodfriend nomination was eventually allowed to expire without being approved, Randy Quarles sits on the Fed today. Subsequent appointments after Quarles and Goodfriend—Richard Clarida and Michelle Bowman—have been better, but given that they have filled slots previously held by governors with dovish views on monetary policy, they have not moved the center of gravity on the BOG in a more dovish direction.
Trump’s most consequential decision on Fed personnel, of course, was the choice to replace Chair Janet Yellen with Jerome Powell. While Powell has been a thoughtful member of the Fed’s BOG in recent years, Yellen had an established track record of pushing past evidence-free claims that the Fed had allowed the economy to overheat and needed to hike interest rates. To be sure, Yellen undertook some rate increases that may have been unwarranted. But she also resisted repeated calls to do the wrong thing. Powell deserves much respect for his performance as a Fed BOG member and chair, but the shift from Yellen to Powell is almost surely one to a Fed less committed to expansionary policy in coming years. It also represents a transition to a Fed chair who does not have a strong track record of resisting calls to raise rates.
In recent weeks, the Fed has implicitly acknowledged that recent rate increases may have overshot, indicating strongly in the March 2019 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that they may go the rest of this year without raising rates again.8 This caution is most welcome. Less welcome is Trump’s declared intent to nominate two rank partisans to the BOG—Stephen Moore and Herman Cain.9 While both Moore and Cain, if appointed to the board, would likely keep monetary policy expansionary as long as President Trump was in the White House, they would almost certainly be just as likely to call for sharp rate increases under Democratic presidents. Both criticized the Fed for being too dovish during the Obama administration. As detailed in an earlier section of this report, partisan Republican policymakers throttled recovery from the Great Recession with fiscal policy choices. If policymakers this partisan are allowed onto the Federal Reserve Board, we would see a repeat of this in future recoveries with monetary policy.
The last two American recessions were unambiguously caused by bursting asset market bubbles: the stock market bubble in 2001 and the housing price bubble after 2006. The clear lesson of these episodes is that policymakers must be vigilant about not letting bubbles inflate to dangerous proportions.
Policymakers—particularly in the regulatory realm—have a number of tools available to keep asset markets from getting dangerously mispriced.10 For one, they can simply point out when historical relationships between underlying fundamentals and asset prices seem to be diverging in some markets. Janet Yellen did this in a single speech in 2014 about technology stocks and sparked a relatively strong downward response from prices. While she did not follow up this warning and prices soon rebounded, she appeared to be testing a demonstration effect of the power of regulators’ talk with her initial speech, and the test went well.
Regulators can also impose quantitative limits on how much debt is taken on to purchase assets. In the case of home prices, for example, the Federal Housing Administration can ratchet down loan-to-value ratios (effectively requiring higher down payments from home buyers) when consumers take out mortgages.
Finally, regulators can ensure that financial institutions are prudently managed and maintain sufficient capital buffers to guard against collapse in the face of small downward movements in asset prices. The housing price bubble bursting would have hurt less (though it certainly would not have been painless) if it had not cascaded through a financial sector whose individual institutions had recklessly loaded up on debt and threatened to topple over like dominoes in the face of the housing price shock.
All approaches to stopping bubbles before they get large enough to harm the American economy have one thing in common: a (rare) willingness to pull the punch bowl away from powerful actors in the financial sector as the bubble inflates.11 Financial sector profits soared as the home price bubble inflated in the early 2000s, reaching about a quarter of all corporate profits even while they accounted for just 5 percent of private-sector employment.12 But crossing the financial sector is not the strong suit of most politicians in either party.
The Trump administration’s track record on standing up to finance is nonexistent. All of its nominees to Fed BOG positions are softer on financial regulation than the members who preceded them. Randal Quarles, a former Carlyle Group executive who occupies the post of vice chair for financial supervision at the board—is particularly soft on finance. For example, Quarles has opposed the Volcker Rule, a regulation that limits bank risk-taking with depositor money and is essentially already a compromise effort to restore some of the safety that the Glass Steagall Act provided the banking sector before it was repealed in 1999.13 While serving as an official in the George W. Bush Treasury Department in the years immediately preceding the worst financial crisis in a generation, Quarles argued that “markets are always ahead of regulators, and frankly that’s how it should be” (Quarles 2005).
Besides Quarles, President Trump’s appointments include Mick Mulvaney as head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Gary Cohn as chair of the National Economic Council (NEC), and Steve Mnuchin as treasury secretary. Mulvaney, a long-time advocate of abolishing the CFPB while in Congress, has urged lobbyists to keep pressuring for a more compliant CFPB and wrote a memo to CFPB staff telling them that they work not just for consumers of financial products but for the providers of these products, too: banks.14 Cohn, a former executive at Goldman Sachs who spearheaded the drive for the 2017 tax cut, told an audience at an event marking the 10th anniversary of the Lehman Brothers collapse that no top financial executive went to jail following the crisis because none of them did anything wrong.15 Prior to joining the Trump administration, Mnuchin headed an investment group that bought the bank IndyMac in California and then made millions by harvesting fees on thousands of foreclosures the bank subsequently initiated, often fraudulently.16
At the moment, there is no glaring, macroeconomically significant asset market bubble that looks guaranteed to burst in coming years. Still, some markets are seeing prices on the high side of historical experience relative to fundamentals, and might require some stiff-backed supervision from financial regulators to avoid becoming a danger to the broader economy before too long. On this front, it is unambiguously clear that the Trump administration is not up to this job and has left the U.S. economy vulnerable.
Regardless of why or when the next recession hits, policymakers should use every effective tool at their disposal to end it as quickly as possible and pin the economy back at full employment. To be effective, these tools need to boost spending by households, businesses, or governments to relieve the aggregate demand shortfall that is the fundamental cause of recessions. The traditional view of mainstream macroeconomics before the Great Recession was that monetary policy would be sufficient to end recessions quickly and that discretionary fiscal stabilization would be either unnecessary or outright harmful.17 This conventional wisdom should be one of the most obvious policy casualties of the Great Recession, and nearly all macroeconomic policy analysts would agree that discretionary fiscal policy should take a role in fighting the next recession and spurring a faster recovery.
A clear lesson from the Great Recession and its aftermath is that the conventional monetary policy response of lowering short-term interest rates—and even the unconventional response of buying long-term assets in order to lower long-term rates—will be insufficient to combat the next recession. This is not just a problem of the “zero lower bound” that binds when the Fed’s short-term interest rates are moved to zero and cannot be lowered any further to help boost spending.18 Even in periods where lowering interest rates is possible, these rate cuts tend to provide weaker medicine than the economy needs to quickly end recessions.19 While raising rates reliably and quickly stems aggregate demand growth, lowering rates does not reliably boost this growth.20 In this long-recognized asymmetrical relationship, lowering interest rates in an attempt to boost growth is often compared to “pushing on a string.”21
However, as weak as the mechanical effects of interest rate cuts are in spurring growth in spending, this does not mean the Federal Reserve should not cut rates as aggressively as possible during recessions. For one, even the weak direct effect of interest rate cuts at least moves the economy in the right direction.22 For another, low interest rates should provide a strong signal to fiscal policymakers that efforts to boost aggregate demand are needed and will be cheap in budgetary terms (as low interest rates reduce public debt service payments). Fiscal policymakers, particularly in Congress, do not generally have huge staffs whose job is almost exclusively focused on monitoring the state of the macroeconomy, whereas the Federal Reserve does. Further, this expertise, as well as its political independence, gives the Fed great influence in economic debates. This leads to fiscal policymakers often following the lead of the Fed when it comes to recession-fighting.
It is, for example, well known that Fed Chair Ben Bernanke was instrumental in convincing an otherwise reluctant Congress to allocate funds for a bailout of the nation’s largest banks in the fall of 2008.23 A common criticism of the Fed’s crisis response, one with real validity, was that they did not provide as powerful an advocacy for sustained fiscal stimulus to help the nonfinancial side of the economy.
In their defense, the Fed’s policy actions during and after the Great Recession—taking unprecedented actions to lower both short- and long-term interest rates—should have been interpreted by fiscal policymakers as a clear call to do more. And they did occasionally make loud calls (at least, “loud” by the standards of central bank communication) highlighting the drag that premature fiscal contraction was imposing on the pace of recovery.24
But the Fed really should not be graded on the curve of their own often-opaque communications. By the standards of normal human communication, that is, by the standards that apply to fiscal policymakers and their staffs and the media who cover them, the linkage between the Fed’s unprecedented efforts to keep interest rates low and the need for fiscal policymakers to do more to spur recovery was not made as explicitly as it should have been.
This failure to translate monetary policy actions into obvious signals for fiscal policymakers to do more does not, of course, excuse fiscal policymakers’ inaction. The fiscal austerity that hamstrung recovery from the Great Recession was not simply the result of good-faith-but-sadly-mistaken efforts to genuinely assess what the economy needed. Rather, the pull toward fiscal austerity was largely rooted in partisan politics.25 But the Fed could have raised the political cost of inaction for these policymakers if monetary actions had been more widely interpreted as calling for more aggressive fiscal actions.
In short, the Fed should be much louder in communicating with other policymakers when their judgment is that the economy needs more stimulus than monetary policy can provide. One way to be loud is simply through more blunt communication. There has been much analysis about the efficacy of Fed communication with other economic decision-makers—so-called forward guidance—over the past decade. Forward guidance is simply providing clear communications and strong signals about the likely short-run trajectory of interest rates. But this forward guidance has always been narrowly focused on the likely path of monetary policy actions only. A more expansive view of the role of forward guidance would be useful in fighting the next recession. Again, the Fed is the primary watchdog for macroeconomic instability. If they bark loudly about the need for fiscal policy support to end a recession (or spur recovery) more quickly, this would put a lot of pressure on other policymakers to act. There is nothing stopping Fed Chairman Powell and his colleagues from explicitly saying that the fiscal austerity resulting from intentional actions of Congress and the president is keeping them from meeting the Fed’s dual legal mandate of maximum employment and price stability.
Another way for the Fed to amplify the need for fiscal policy support for ending recessions and spurring recovery is to adopt even stronger unconventional monetary policy tools. After the Great Recession, the Fed’s quantitative easing program largely consisted of them announcing targets for the value of assets that they would purchase over a given time frame. The Fed’s purchase of these assets pushed down long-term interest rates and helped boost demand, but the degree of interest rate lowering was largely uncertain ex ante. An alternative way of undertaking quantitative easing would be to pre-commit to the interest rate reduction the Fed was targeting, with the scale of asset purchases being open-ended.
For example, the Fed could have said they were targeting a 2 percent nominal 10-year Treasury interest rate and would buy as many bonds as needed to achieve this target. Any ambitious long-run interest rate target may well have required substantially larger asset purchases than the Fed actually undertook, but in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, this just means monetary policy would have been more expansionary overall—a good thing. Beyond the mechanical boost from more expansionary monetary policy, a long-term interest rate target would have been a dramatic invitation to fiscal policymakers to do more, and could have encouraged them directly to do more by assuring them that long-term debt payments arising from more stimulus would be modest.
The most direct way for policymakers to fill the aggregate demand gap that drives recessions is public spending. But public spending following the recession’s trough in 2009 was historically slow relative to other business cycles, particularly before 2017. This was the case even as the ability of monetary policy to fight the recession to that point had been severely hamstrung by the zero lower bound on interest rates.26
Figure B shows the cumulative growth in per capita spending by federal, state, and local governments over the business cycle following the troughs of the 11 recessions since World War II. Astoundingly, per capita government spending in the first quarter of 2016—twenty-seven quarters into the recovery—was nearly 4.9 percent lower than at the trough of the Great Recession. By contrast, 27 quarters into the early 1990s recovery, per capita government spending was 3.6 percent higher than at the trough; 24 quarters after the early 2000s recession (a shorter recovery that did not last a full 27 quarters), it was almost 10 percent higher; and 27 quarters into the early 1980s recovery, it was more than 17 percent higher.
| Quarters since trough | 1949Q4 | 1954Q2 | 1958Q2 | 1961Q1 | 1970Q4 | 1975Q1 | 1980Q3 | 1982Q4 | 1991Q1 | 2001Q4 | 2009Q2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -6 | 92.79903 | ||||||||||
| -5 | 94.42455 | 96.86089 | 93.1549 | ||||||||
| -4 | 92.97881 | 104.5763 | 97.76742 | 95.9536 | 97.26268 | 98.41396 | |||||
| -3 | 95.80659 | 103.7704 | 95.68662 | 95.6534 | 97.96079 | 96.90702 | 97.1442 | 97.21738 | 95.26491 | ||
| -2 | 99.68691 | 103.7435 | 97.34544 | 97.21321 | 99.11551 | 97.38414 | 99.6841 | 97.67438 | 98.68033 | 98.40091 | 95.54005 |
| -1 | 101.0297 | 102.2883 | 97.44405 | 97.94855 | 99.51544 | 97.9963 | 99.37112 | 98.52386 | 99.19218 | 98.76741 | 97.47838 |
| 0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| 1 | 106.652 | 99.00479 | 100.6313 | 100.3652 | 99.50026 | 101.2492 | 99.24907 | 100.3054 | 100.3142 | 101.6368 | 99.52924 |
| 2 | 101.2557 | 98.62369 | 101.5953 | 101.3941 | 100.6452 | 102.1758 | 99.73392 | 100.705 | 99.99911 | 102.4237 | 99.4363 |
| 3 | 97.5566 | 99.12395 | 100.704 | 102.7161 | 100.4491 | 102.3636 | 99.28496 | 100.8003 | 99.87627 | 102.5812 | 100.3436 |
| 4 | 101.5171 | 98.39362 | 101.1484 | 103.7797 | 100.2865 | 102.6974 | 99.83932 | 99.84297 | 101.2984 | 102.879 | 100.2655 |
| 5 | 107.3538 | 98.55248 | 101.4558 | 103.8774 | 101.0244 | 101.4687 | 100.5263 | 101.3832 | 103.0006 | 99.54466 | |
| 6 | 116.9505 | 97.05224 | 100.7513 | 105.4147 | 101.2774 | 101.4071 | 101.735 | 101.5793 | 103.5206 | 98.79907 | |
| 7 | 125.7723 | 97.07004 | 99.66259 | 106.0131 | 100.2924 | 101.1465 | 102.2704 | 101.3158 | 103.4658 | 97.75721 | |
| 8 | 129.7541 | 98.39858 | 100.6858 | 105.6846 | 102.611 | 101.5311 | 103.7657 | 100.9122 | 103.7324 | 97.01971 | |
| 9 | 131.6787 | 97.81254 | 105.3738 | 103.2787 | 101.5467 | 104.8214 | 100.7311 | 104.192 | 95.85859 | ||
| 10 | 135.4297 | 99.366 | 108.5523 | 102.8074 | 102.0295 | 106.1938 | 100.6341 | 104.3718 | 95.38564 | ||
| 11 | 135.852 | 101.1222 | 108.0357 | 102.2027 | 101.8212 | 107.7791 | 100.6285 | 104.5238 | 94.67948 | ||
| 12 | 137.5306 | 101.243 | 108.6355 | 102.7584 | 101.591 | 108.055 | 100.3789 | 104.5423 | 94.15164 | ||
| 13 | 140.9415 | 101.7904 | 109.3489 | 102.5296 | 109.0963 | 100.6532 | 105.1607 | 93.95881 | |||
| 14 | 142.3413 | 109.443 | 103.4517 | 110.6795 | 101.4527 | 105.1287 | 93.48459 | ||||
| 15 | 109.5364 | 103.7356 | 112.2495 | 101.0538 | 105.31 | 93.41973 | |||||
| 16 | 109.9874 | 102.9802 | 112.1538 | 101.6724 | 105.408 | 93.28635 | |||||
| 17 | 111.1166 | 102.9627 | 112.5128 | 101.9055 | 107.1431 | 92.95273 | |||||
| 18 | 114.9528 | 103.8694 | 112.9643 | 101.6099 | 107.1671 | 92.41171 | |||||
| 19 | 116.0413 | 103.9585 | 112.7088 | 100.9847 | 107.072 | 92.23086 | |||||
| 20 | 117.8536 | 104.6344 | 113.646 | 101.6527 | 107.9508 | 92.3369 | |||||
| 21 | 119.1939 | 113.8692 | 102.2766 | 108.5867 | 92.6896 | ||||||
| 22 | 121.8915 | 113.9332 | 102.1348 | 109.1526 | 92.86114 | ||||||
| 23 | 124.5182 | 113.7117 | 102.4409 | 109.4264 | 93.67068 | ||||||
| 24 | 128.8423 | 114.9939 | 102.4443 | 109.7915 | 94.35335 | ||||||
| 25 | 128.7783 | 115.7054 | 103.0859 | 94.55128 | |||||||
| 26 | 130.0413 | 116.6918 | 103.2984 | 94.62728 | |||||||
| 27 | 131.0418 | 117.5117 | 103.6022 | 95.08481 | |||||||
| 28 | 133.4422 | 118.2052 | 103.7908 | 94.95413 | |||||||
| 29 | 134.9219 | 119.8691 | 104.8758 | 94.9973 | |||||||
| 30 | 135.7141 | 119.8933 | 105.4035 | 94.87157 | |||||||
| 31 | 136.0944 | 119.8235 | 105.7598 | 94.9922 | |||||||
| 32 | 136.8323 | 106.5886 | 94.96186 | ||||||||
| 33 | 136.9189 | 106.9218 | 94.83272 | ||||||||
| 34 | 137.3127 | 107.6688 | 95.0302 | ||||||||
| 35 | 136.3535 | 108.5848 | 95.41862 | ||||||||
| 36 | 108.3443 | 95.74696 | |||||||||
| 37 | 109.2122 | 96.37835 | |||||||||
| 38 | 108.9711 | 96.77549 |
The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.